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We examine the impact of shareholder rights protection on U.S
multinational firms’ Foreign Direct Investments (FDI). We hypothesize that the
expropriation of wealth is less likely to occur in countries with strong
shareholder rights and hence, these countries will attract more FDI relative to
countries with weaker shareholder rights protection. We also hypothesize that
this relationship will be more important for developing countries compared to
developed countries. Based on an analysis of US FDI data over the period
1997-2016, we find support for our predictions. These findings emphasize the
importance of institutional development for economic development, via the
attraction of FDI. (JEL: F21, F23, G30, O16)
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I.  Introduction
The diffusion of pro-market institutions, together with technology, has
played a powerful role in shaping firm strategies, local economic
development and global economic integration, especially since the
1980s (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2019). The implementation of these rules
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and regulations governing market-based transactions reduce direct
government involvement in business (North, 1990), which in turn
impacts domestic firm profitability (Park et al., 2006; Del Sol and
Kogan, 2007; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008). When economies transition by
implementing pro-market institutions, they generally become more open
and attractive to foreign investors (Henisz, 2000; Alimov, 2015). In
countries whose governments tend to play a less direct role in economic
development, foreign investments face fewer liabilities related to
bribery, corruption, tax and trade discrimination and asset expropriation
(Globerman and Shapiro, 2003; Awokuse and Yin, 2010).
Despite the substantial investigation into the impact of broad indices
of pro-market reforms on domestic and international business strategies,
there is relatively less research on specific institutions, such as
shareholder rights protection. We conduct our study in the context of
US outward foreign direct investments (FDI) worldwide, addressing an
apparent paradox in research on FDI. Specifically, agency theory
predicts that multinational enterprise (MNE) managers can use FDI as
a means of ‘escaping’ more of the restrictive legal requirements of their
home countries (Witt and Lewin, 2007; Barnard and Luiz, 2018).
However, research has repeatedly shown that MNE managers’ decisions
are well aligned with the interests of shareholders, arguing that
shareholder rights protection is particularly attractive to firms from that
country, given that shareholder rights protection is rigorous at home.
Based primarily on agency theory, we argue that although shareholder
rights in a foreign country do not necessarily protect investors in the
home or third country, they do result in lower monitoring costs which
in turn induce favorable reactions from shareholders. Furthermore,
bonding theory predicts that managers are compelled to act in
accordance with shareholder interests out of a sense of obligation and
identification (Hoskisson et al., 2009; Garcia-Cabrera and Garcia-Soto,
2012). While this may not be the case for outward FDI from all
countries, corporations in the US are amongst the most rigorously
aligned to the interests of shareholders (Glendening et al., 2016).
Using a sample of 64 unique developing and developed countries
that received FDI from U.S multinational firms between 1997 to 2016,
we find that the shareholder right index is positively related to inward
FDI from U.S multinational firms. We also show that the protection of
shareholders from expropriation is more important in developing
countries compared to developed countries. This latter finding supports
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our argument that institutional development is not only important. In
general, but also more important for developing countries than
developed countries, in attracting foreign FDI.
This paper contributes novel findings concerning MNEs regional
strategies, specifically by providing an institutional view on market
entry (Rugman and Verbeke, 2005; Arregle et al., 2013, 2016; Verbeke
and Kano, 2016). It also contributes to FDI theory by adding a
counterpoint to the generalized view that MNEs can overcome
institutional voids via FDI (Buckley and Casson, 1998; Verbeke and
Kano, 2012; Narula and Verbeke, 2015). We argue that MNEs are more,
not less, exposed to political risk in host countries with weaker or absent
shareholder rights protection. Our finding that FDI in developing
economies is more attracted to countries with higher shareholder rights
protection, relative to other countries within the region, supports this
argument. Our finding that shareholder rights protection plays a much
stronger role in developing, versus developed, countries suggests future
research on institutional effects on FDI should consider the strength of
institutions relative to a country peer group, such as a trading block or
economically integrated region.
In the following section, we review the literature on FDI location
choice and shareholder reactions to formulate our hypotheses
concerning the impact of shareholder rights protection on FDI inflows.
Following this, we describe our data and methodological approach.
Next, we present the results of our hypothesis testing and discuss these
within the context of existing literature. Finally, we conclude with a
summary of our findings, contributions, and extensions.
II. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
A. Shareholder Rights Protection and FDI Attractiveness
Several studies find that the strength of a host country’s governance
infrastructure is an important determinant in attracting FDI. For
example, Globerman and Shapiro (2003) find that the legal system that
protects property and individual rights, stable public institutions and
government policies that favor free and open markets all have a positive
impact on US foreign direct investments and argue that FDI will be
attracted to regions characterized by more favorable governance
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infrastructure.  Investments in governance infrastructure not only attract
capital but also create the conditions under which domestic
multinational corporations emerge and invest abroad. Furthermore, Gani
(2007) shows that governance indicators such as the rule of law, control
of corruption, regulatory quality, government effectiveness, and
political stability are positively correlated with FDI.  Morrissey and
Udomkerdmongkol (2012), defining governance as voice and
accountability, political stability and absence of violence, regulatory
quality, rule of law and control of corruption, find that total investments
are greater in countries with good governance. However, the benefits of
shareholder rights protection, which has not previously been studied as
a determinant of FDI location, are not clearly linked to the benefits of
the firm or its managers. We explore competing arguments for both
positive and negative influences of shareholder rights protection on FDI
location attractiveness, ultimately arguing that the positive impacts
outweigh the negative, at least within the context of FDI from countries
which themselves have stronger shareholder rights protection.
Denis et al. (2002) argued that global diversification represents a
cost arising from the agency relationship that exists between managers
and investors. According to agency theory, managers can increase their
utility and status by growing the firm through international expansion
(Jensen, 1986; Eisenhardt, 1989). As agents of the shareholders,
charged with maximizing profitability, managers may use FDI as a
means to evade restrictions on personal rent seeking, including
expanding the size of the firm in order to justify increases to their
salary, benefits, or even satisfy their hubris (Seth et al., 2002; Buckley
and Strange, 2011). The managers of these firms may also use
subsidiaries in countries with weak regulatory oversight to facilitate
concealment and diversion (Desai, 2005). Lskavyan and Spatareanu
(2011) furthermore argue that weak legal shareholder protection in host
countries makes it more costly for parent company shareholders to
monitor foreign subsidiary and hold managers accountable in the case
of misconduct. Therefore, managerial autonomy and the scope for
pursuing private benefits increases (Hope et al., 2011). By engaging in
empire-building, they fail to place shareholders' interests at the core of
strategic decision-making (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Hence, a
manager whose interests are not well aligned with shareholders would
seek to avoid investing in a country with strong shareholder rights
protection.
Although agency theory would predict that shareholder rights
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protection would have a negative impact on the attraction of FDI, this
argument loses its strength when the limited jurisdiction of shareholder
rights protection laws is considered. That is, even where the board of
directors provides strong oversight in representing shareholder interests,
shareholder rights protection, in the host country, doesn’t benefit
shareholders in the MNE home country. Despite this, empirical research
on FDI, from the field of international business, has repeatedly shown
that MNE managers are much more likely to act in accordance with
shareholder interests rather than their own. These observations are
counter to the predictions of agency theory cited above, and so there is
a paradox which might be explained by differences between the
governance institutions studied and the owner-oriented focus of
shareholder rights protection. First, the governance literature tends to
focus on macro institutional governance mechanisms, such as political
and legal institutions, as they relate to determinants of FDI (e.g.
Globerman and Shapiro, 2002, 2003; Gani, 2007).  Research on the FDI
attractiveness of more micro, shareholder-oriented, governance
mechanisms must take into account agency mechanism in addition to
the transaction costs minimization rationale for international expansion
(Buckley and Strange, 2011).
Another argument for the positive influence of shareholder rights
protection on FDI attractiveness is that subsidiary managers and
shareholder interests may be substantially aligned. ‘Midrange’
stakeholder theory predicts that the management practices of a local
subsidiary will be more in line with the expectations of home country
stakeholders when the institutional environments of the two countries
are similar (Crilly, 2011). Hence, choosing a location with strong
shareholder rights protection signals the foreign subsidiary’s
shareholder orientation, reducing agency costs for the overall MNE.
MNE managers in the home country, who are already substantially
aligned with the interests of their shareholders, will engage in less
monitoring of the management of local subsidiaries in foreign countries
with strong shareholder protection, reducing overall agency costs, and
protecting their own stake in the company. Subsidiary-level stakeholder
orientation is consistent with research showing that the global standards
to which multinational corporations are held results in powerful
incentives which align MNE management practices with the home
country institutions (Le et al., 2013; Glendening et al., 2016; Mason et
al., 2017).
In accordance with bonding theory, (Hoskisson et al., 2009;
Multinational Finance Journal160
Garcia-Cabrera and Garcia-Soto, 2012) managers making FDI decisions
may be well-aligned with shareholders not only as a matter of financial
benefits, but also sometimes out of a sense of accountability.  Indeed,
conformance with local practices by a foreign MNC is unlikely,
especially when the host country’s institutional environment is weak
while that of the investor country is strong (Crilly, 2011). Similarly,
bonding costs (Hoskisson et al., 2009) emerge because a CEO of a
multinational firm may commit him/herself to contractual obligations
that constrain his/her activities, resulting in reduced agency costs.
Hence, managers of MNEs may legally and reputationally signal their
willingness to limit expropriation from shareholders and reduce agency
costs by investing in countries with strong shareholder rights protection.
Finally, although shareholder rights in the host country do not
protect shareholder rights in the MNE home country, agency theorists
have argued that it may have an indirect effect. According to agency
theory, there exists a set of the most efficient shareholder rights
protection, typically modeled after the Anglo-American model (Luo et
al., 2009). Arguably, having effective shareholder rights protection
reduces agency costs associated with the risk of expropriation,
empire-building, and monitoring costs. Doukas and Lang (2003) argue
that, since the operations of MNCs are geographically dispersed,
difficulties in gathering and processing information make monitoring
costlier in foreign subsidiaries than in parent firms. Hence, increased
monitoring costs and other agency problems associated with foreign
investments may discourage such FDI. As a result, managers can signal
their intent to reduce agency costs by investment in countries with
strong shareholder rights protection. Likewise, Coffee Jr (1998, 2002)
and Stulz (1999) predict that MNEs’ FDI, which are subjected to
stringent investor protections, can constrain shareholder expropriation
and hence, reduce agency costs. Furthermore, (Lien et al., 2005) argue
that when there is an increase in information asymmetry between
managers and owners/shareholders, that is related to the
internationalization of the firm, the shareholders may use governance
mechanisms to mitigate the associated agency costs. Hence, we predict:
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between the strength
of a country’s shareholder rights protection, as indicated by the
magnitude of the shareholder rights index and the amount of inward
FDI received.
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B. Shareholder Rights in Developing Vs. Developed Countries
The literature on FDI suggests that there are significant differences
between developed and less developed countries in terms of both
competitive and institutional environments (Makino et al., 2004; Mingo
et al., 2018). Makino et al. (2004) argue that less developed countries
have a greater potential for economic growth but weaker institutional
support such as lower levels of property rights protection and
enforcement mechanism compared to developed countries. Globerman
and Shapiro (2003) show that improvements in governance
infrastructure are important determinants of economic growth for
developing and transition economies, alike. Similarly, good institutional
quality is an important attractor of FDI (Buchanan et al. (2012). Hence,
we argue that developing countries provide greater growth opportunities
for U.S. MNEs, but their achievement is often hindered by institutional
voids. Institutional voids refer to the lack of mechanisms that support
economic liberalization and property rights and from the perspective of
agency theory, increase information asymmetries between managers and
owners of corporations (Contractor et al., 2014). FDI provides foreign
investors with a way to control operations in a foreign country while
overcoming political risk (Delios and Henisz, 2003). However, this
suggests that MNEs face a choice between direct investment and
avoiding a country altogether when considering political risk.
Shareholder rights protection, however, protects a firm’s invested
assets, and so establishing wholly-owned subsidiaries or equity joint
ventures increases the MNE’s exposure to expropriation, where
shareholder rights protection is weak or nonexistent.  Desai and Moel
(2008) show that despite an investor’s 99% interest in the joint venture,
the local partner managed to divert value from the underlying entity for
personal benefits.
Hence, we argue that shareholder rights protection can bridge or
eliminate institutional voids common in emerging markets (Clark and
Tunaru, 2001; Wi Saeng et al., 2003; Khanna et al., 2005) that FDI
alone cannot. Therefore, we expect that shareholder rights protection
plays a greater role in attracting FDI to developing countries relative to
developed countries, where the institutional environment is generally
more developed and reliable. For example, Kinda (2010) shows that
constraints related to investment climates such as infrastructure
problems, financing constraints and institutional problems hamper FDI
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in developing countries. Furthermore, Dollar et al. (2006) conclude that
a better investment climate, in general, encourages FDI.  Similarly, for
a sample of developing countries, Sekkat and Veganzones Varoudakis
(2007) show that countries having opened their economy were able to
attract more FDI. The improvement in other aspects of the investment
climate can result in an increase in FDI inflows that is even more
important than the one resulting from greater openness.
We argue that shareholder rights protection is important in
enhancing the investment climate, reducing agency problems and
potentially reducing institutional voids in emerging economies. 
Therefore, we predict that:
Hypothesis 2: The positive relationship between the strength of a
country’s shareholder rights protection, as indicated by the
magnitude of the shareholder rights index and the amount of inward
FDI received, is stronger in developing countries compared to
developed countries.
III. Data and Methodology
A. Data
Our sample period is from 1997 to 2016. FDI data is capital expenditure
by U.S multinational firms and it is collected from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis. Our main variable of interest is the shareholder
rights protection index constructed by Guillen and Capron (2016). They
constructed an index of minority shareholder protection for 78
least-developed, emerging, and developed countries based on, for
example, powers of the general meeting for de facto changes;
agenda-setting power; prohibition of multiple voting rights; independent
board members; feasibility of directors’ dismissal, etc.  Also, we extract
GDP per capita, GDP growth to control for economic prospects, the
total population from World Development Indicators, FDI stock from
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),
trade ratio using data from World Trade Organization (WTO), political
constraint index and rule of law from the World Governance Indicators
project (Kaufmann et al., 2008). We use the UN Human Development
Index (HDI) to proxy for the quality of life and real exchange data is
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from Bruegel.1 We collect data on culture using Hofstede’s indicators.
Finally, we divide countries into developed and developing subsamples
based on the United Nation’s World Economic Situation and Prospects
(WESP) 2019 report.
After merging all the data, we drop countries with missing data. Our
final sample is a panel dataset with 1,208 country-year observations.
This represents 64 unique developing and developed countries that
received FDI from a U.S multinational firm from 1997 to 2016.  
B. Methodology
We utilize a panel regression technique with year and country fixed
effects to examine our hypotheses. We estimate the following
regression:




i t t i i i t i t
i
FDI Y  

   
where log FDIi,t is the log transformation of total FDI by U.S
multinational firms in country i and time t. Our main variable of interest
is minority shareholder rights (ShareRight) index constructed by Guillen
and Capron (2016). To construct a cross-national, comparative measure,
Guillen and Capron (2016) collected information on the ten key legal
provisions identified as most relevant to the protection of minority
shareholder rights (Lele and Siems, 2007; Siems, 2008): powers of the
general meeting for de facto changes; agenda-setting power; the
anticipation of shareholder decision facilitated; prohibition of multiple
voting rights; independent board members; feasibility of directors’
dismissal; private enforcement of directors’ duties (derivative suit);
shareholder action against resolutions of the general meeting;
mandatory bid; and disclosure of major share ownership. If present,
each of these legal provisions provides minority shareholders with a
comprehensive set of protections against the actions of large
shareholders and/or management and in the event of a change in
corporate control. See, Guillen and Capron (2016) for detailed
information on the construction of the index.
Based on the existing empirical and theoretical literature, we control
1. Bruegel is a Brussels-based economic think tank (Darvas, 2012).
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for several macroeconomic, political, institutional, and legal measures
that have been proven to influence FDI. We include the gross domestic
product (log of GDP) to account for market size and it is expected to be
positive. Large market size is expected to attract FDI because of
economies of scale in production and distribution for products
(Globerman and Shapiro, 2003). Furthermore, market size may be
associated with agglomeration economies that lower costs for all
producers in that market (Krugman, 1991). Hence, we include FDI
stock (log of FDI) as a proxy of agglomeration of economies.
Furthermore, several studies show that political stability influences FDI
flows (Levis, 1979; Root and Ahmed, 1979; Schneider and Frey, 1985;
Wei, 1997). Hence, we utilized the political constraint index to measure
political stability and rule of law to control political and legal risk. Also,
we control for market competitiveness using GDP growth and
population to measure the labor pool (Bailey, 2018).
Following Globerman and Shapiro (2003), we also include the HDI
as a further control variable to account for several factors that have been
shown to influence FDI.2 The literature suggests that HDI is a valid
proxy for the quality of life. Therefore, we expect that higher levels of
HDI will attract more FDI. 
The FDI literature suggests exchange rates may affect FDI flows and
hence, we include real effective exchange rate as a control variable
(Frühwirth et al., 2007). Several studies have documented a negative
relationship between measures of foreign exchange volatility and FDI
flows (Froot and Stein, 1991; Kogut and Chang, 1996; Barrell and Pain,
1997). Furthermore, Globerman and Shapiro (2003) argue that currency
volatility is likely to discourage FDI of risk-averse investors. Since they
view volatility as a direct or indirect cost. We expect real exchange rates
to be negatively associated with FDI flows.
To control for cultural distance, we include the Hofstede cultural
indicators (Mingo et al., 2018). Given that the cultural indicators are
time-invariant, we include them in a panel regression framework
without country fixed effects.3
2. Given that the Human Development Index (HDI) is relatively correlated with the rule
of law, we estimate the model with both and with rule of law only and the results are similar.
HDI is derived from three sub-indices: GDP/population, educational literacy and enrolment,
and life expectancy at birth.
3. We use a Random Effect Generalized Least Square technique.
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IV. Results
A. Descriptive Statistics
In table 1, panel A, we report the summary statistics for the entire
sample. The average FDI in the sample is $2.18b (median is $711mil).
In terms of shareholder rights protection index, the mean is 5.30
(median is 5.50). In addition, mean (median) human development index
is 0.57 (0.55). In terms of a proxy for the labor pool (population) in a
country, the average is 80.50m with a median of 23.77m individuals.
The average FDI stock in the sample is $174.7b with a median of
$65.4b. The average market size (GDP) is $600b (median is $210.7b)
while the mean GDP growth is 3.38%. We control for openness to
foreign investment of an economy using the trade ratio. The mean
(median) trade ratio is 72.3% (57%). In terms of legal and political risk,
the mean rule of law and political stability (political constraint index)
for the entire sample is 0.48 and 0.39, respectively. Finally, the averages
for Hofstede’s culture indicators are power distance (60.34),
individualism (42.38), masculinity (47.42) and uncertainty avoidance
(65.93).
In panel B, we present descriptive statistics for developed and
developing countries as well as the tests for differences in mean (t-test)
and median (Wilcoxon rank-sum test). Developed countries tend to
attract more FDI from U.S multinational firms, have larger GDP, GDP
per capita, FDI stock, higher HDI, rule of law and political constraints
index scores compared to developing countries. On the other hand,
developing countries tend to have a larger population, higher GDP
growth rate and higher power distance relative to developed countries
in our sample.  In terms of openness of the economy, developed
countries are not different from developing countries (71.65% vs.
72.79%). We find similar results for masculinity and uncertainty
avoidance whereas developed countries have a higher score for
individualism (mean of 58.32) compared to developing countries (mean
of 28.04).
In table 2, we report the correlation matrix of the variables used in
our model. The correlation is relatively what is expected. However, the
rule of law and human development index are relatively correlated. In
our estimation model, we only include rule of law in one specification
and then both in a second specification and the results are quantitatively
similar. Hence, our concerns with multicollinearity are alleviated.
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B. Regression Results
In table 3, we present the panel regression results with and without
country and year fixed effects. The results support our hypothesis 1 that
higher minority shareholder rights protection leads to an increase in FDI
by U.S multinational firms. In column I, we did not include HDI given
that it is correlated with rule of law. We find that the shareholder rights
index is statistically significant at the 1% level. This implies that U.S
multinationals are more likely to invest in countries where expropriation
of shareholders’ wealth is less likely and governance mechanisms are
in place that mitigate agency costs. Hence, hypothesis 1 is strongly
supported. Our findings are consistent with the agency theory arguments
forwarded by Lien et al. (2005). Similarly, our findings are in line with
the bonding costs theory of Hoskisson et al. (2009) that CEOs of MNEs
TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics
A. Entire Sample
Mean Median St. Dev. Obs.
FDI (mil) 2,178.6880 711.0000 4,121.7310 1208
Shareholder Rights 5.2992 5.5000 1.4586 1208
Real effective exchange rate 101.5698 100.0000 18.7542 1208
Human development index (HDI) 0.5686 0.5500 0.1678 1208
Population (mil) 80.5008 23.7749 220.8531 1208
FDI stock (mil) 174,739 65,375 265,328 1208
GDP (mil) 600,051 210,676 1,123,277 1208
GDP per capita 18,917 10,463 20,700 1208
GDP growth rate % 3.3777 3.3752 3.5624 1208
Trade ratio % 72.2700 56.9800 54.4200 1208
Rule of law 0.4756 0.4600 1.0309 1208
Political constraint index 0.3946 0.4362 0.1770 1208
Power distance 60.3437 64.0000 20.8008 1123
Individualism 42.3847 35.0000 23.6759 1123
Masculinity 47.4212 50.0000 18.8654 1123
Uncertainty avoidance 65.9323 70.0000 22.5746 1123
Political Risk Index (PRS) 73.7323 73.8801 9.0709 1208
Note:  FDI is foreign direct investment from US multinational firms. Shareholder Rights
is the Guillen and Capron (2016) cross-national comparative legal measure of shareholder
protection. FDI stock is total FDI. Trade ratio is defined as (export + import)/GDP. Political
constraint index measures political risk. Power distance, individualism, masculinity and
uncertainty avoidance is the Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. Political Risk Index (PRS)
measures political and country risk.


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE 3. Panel Regression for Minority Shareholder Index on U.S. MNE FDI
FE FE REGLS
I II III
ShareRights 0.1033*** 0.1058*** 0.0677***
(3.93) (4.07) (2.74)
Log (GDP) 0.8523*** 0.9073*** 0.8511***
(11.05) (11.79) (11.60)
Log (FDI stock) 0.3808*** 0.4024*** 0.4425***
(9.73) (10.34) (10.55)
GDP Growth 0.0031 0.0067 0.0058
(0.64) (1.38) (1.22)
Trade Ratio –0.0047 –0.0569 –0.0692
(–0.05) (–0.57) (–0.72)   
Rule of law –0.0032 –0.0609 –0.0303
(–0.04) (–0.68) (–0.35)   
Political constraint index –0.3986*** –0.3971*** –0.2441** 
(–3.28) (–3.31) (–2.09)   
Log (population) 0.1917 0.2942 0.1062
(0.95) (1.47) (1.00)
Real effective exchange rate –0.0045*** –0.0053*** –0.0049***
(–4.64) (–5.43) (–5.84)   
Human development index 3.0977*** 2.4102***
(5.21) (4.42)
Power distance –0.0051
(–0.49)   
Individualism –0.0248***
(–2.77)   
Masculinity –0.0051
(–0.63)   
Uncertainty Avoidance –0.0067
(–1.01)   
Intercept –8.1370*** –10.7020*** –7.5179***
(–9.28) (–10.74) (–6.44)   
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes No 
N 1,208 1,208 1,123 
Adj. R2 45.1% 46.3% 53.3%
Note:  The dependent variable is log (FDI) where FDI is foreign direct investment for
US multinational firms. Shareholder Rights is the Guillen and Capron (2016) cross-national
comparative legal measure of shareholder protection. FDI stock is total FDI. Trade ratio is
defined as (export + import)/GDP. Political constraint index measures political risk. Power
distance, individualism, masculinity and uncertainty avoidance is the Hofstede’s cultural
dimensions. The t-statistics are reported below the estimated coefficients in parentheses. ***,
**, * represents 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.
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may bond themselves to actions such as investing in a strong
shareholder protection environment to reduce agency costs associated
with international diversification. Furthermore, our findings that
countries with strong shareholder rights protection attract a greater
amount of U.S MNEs FDI supports the argument that a formal
corporate governance structure that protects shareholders reduces the
classic agency costs and hence, encourages managers in countries with
strong shareholder rights to act in the interests of their shareholders
(Kuipers et al., 2009).
In terms of control variables, market size (GDP) and FDI stock are
positively influencing additional FDI. Furthermore, higher political risk,
as well as higher real effective exchange rates result in lower FDI.
Other control variables such as GDP growth, trade ratio, rule of law,
and labor force appears to be insignificant in our sample. Following
Globerman and Shapiro (2003), we include the human development
index (in column II) as an additional control variable. HDI is derived
from three sub-indices: GDP/population, educational literacy and
enrolment, and life expectancy at birth. Globerman and Shapiro (2003),
argue that health and education components are direct measures of
human capital. The GDP per capita component is a measure of wealth
that has traditionally been used to measure consumer demand but it may
also serve as a proxy measure for physical infrastructure. We include
the log of GDP and GDP growth rate which is also a measure of wealth
and consumer demand. The correlation between HDI and GDP is 0.25
while it is -0.30 with GDP growth. The results are quantitatively like
those in column I. HDI is positive and significant at the 1% level.
In column III, we control for Hofstede’s cultural indicators, to
account for psychological distances between the US and the FDI
locations.  Our results remain the same with the addition of these
control variables. All the cultural indicators are negatively related to
FDI but statistically insignificant except for individualism.
To test hypothesis 2, we divided our sample into developed countries
and developing countries based on the United Nation’s World Economic
Situation and Prospects (WESP) 2019 report. This resulted in 52.74%
of the countries in our sample to be classified as developing while
47.26% are classified as developed countries. We report the results for
sub-sample analyses in table 4. As hypothesized, we find that the
protection of shareholder rights is more important in developing
countries compared to developed countries. Our shareholder rights
protection index is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level.
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This implies that in countries with growth opportunities where
expropriation of shareholders’ wealth is more likely to occur, the
protection of shareholder rights is an important factor in attracting FDI
from U.S multinational firms. Our results are consistent with prior
studies (Makino et al., 2004; Sekkat and Veganzones Varoudakis, 2007;
TABLE 4. Developing Vs. Developed Countries
Developing Developed 
ShareRights 0.2234*** 0.0025
(5.46) (0.08)   
Log (GDP) 1.0833*** 1.1784***
(9.78) (5.80)
Log (FDI stock) 0.5038*** 0.3063***
(8.19) (6.40)
GDP growth 0.0053 0.0036
(1.06) (0.46)
Trade ratio –0.0176 –0.0677
(–0.14)   (–0.31)
Rule of law –0.0755 –0.3051*
(–0.64)   (–1.91)   
Political constraint index –0.4779*** 0.0952
(–3.25)   (0.37)
Log (population) 0.3067  0.8021
(1.16) (1.60)
Real effective exchange rate –0.0062*** –0.0099*** 
(–5.31)   (–2.75)   
Human development index 2.2483** 2.2273***
(2.25) (2.90)
Intercept –13.1157*** –13.3077***
(–8.99)   (–5.56)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes 
N 637 571
Adj. R2 50.7% 41.9%
Note:  Developed vs. developing countries are defined based on the United Nation’s
World Economic Situation and Prospects (WESP) 2019 report. The dependent variable is log
(FDI) where FDI is foreign direct investment for US multinational firms. Shareholder Rights
is the Guillen and Capron (2016) cross-national comparative legal measure of shareholder
protection. FDI stock is total FDI. Trade ratio is defined as (export + import)/GDP. Political
constraint index measures political risk. Power distance, individualism, masculinity and
uncertainty avoidance is the Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. The t-statistics are reported
below the estimated coefficients in parentheses. ***, **, * represents 1%, 5% and 10%
significance levels, respectively.
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Kinda, 2010) that better investment climate as well as reducing
institutional voids encourage FDI. Furthermore, our findings that strong
shareholder rights protection in developing countries is an important
determinant of U.S MNEs FDI supports the conjecture by Desai and
Moel (2008) that multinational firms are likely to benefit from stronger
investor protection compared to local firms. In terms of control
variables, market size, FDI stock, political risk, real exchange rate and
HDI are like those reported in table 3.
In terms of developed countries, the protection of shareholder rights
index is positive but statistically insignificant in our sample (table 4,
column II). This suggests that expropriation risk is lower in developed
countries and hence, protection of shareholders’ rights appears to be less
important relative to developing countries as a determinant of FDI. One
potential explanation is that the judicial and legal recourse in the event
of expropriation of shareholders is enough to attract FDI from U.S
multinational firms. Also, developed countries tend to have bilateral or
multilateral trade agreements that may further alleviate the risk of
potential expropriation.
C. Robustness Check 
We conducted several robustness checks. First, to ensure that our results
are robust, we group-demeaned shareholder rights protection index and
the FDI, defining the groups by geographic region, and re-run our
analysis. This was done because while our main fixed effect model
essentially eliminates the effect of unobserved heterogeneity amongst
countries, there may also be unobserved heterogeneity between regions.
Specifically, due to regional economic integration amongst countries,
inward FDI to a focal country may be partially determined by
shareholder rights protection, relative to regional member countries.
Also, different regions generally attract different levels of inward FDI
for non-institutional factors, such as resource endowments and
comparative advantages. The results, which are like those presented in
table 3, are shown in table 5.  Second, La Porta et al. (1997) show that
countries with poorer investor protections, measured by both the
character of legal rules and the quality of law enforcement, have smaller
and narrower capital markets and hence may attract less FDI. Therefore,
following Globerman and Shapiro (2003) we include civil and common
as additional control variables using the University of Ottawa Faculty
of Law taxonomy. They classify legal systems into pure common law
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TABLE 5. Demeaned Shareholder Index on U.S. MNE FDI
FE FE REGLS
I II III
Demeaned ShareRights 0.1033*** 0.1058*** 0.0751***
(3.93) (4.07) (2.98)
Log (GDP) 0.8523*** 0.9073*** 0.7722***
(11.05) (11.79) (10.38)
Log (FDI stock) 0.3808*** 0.4024*** 0.4379***
(9.73) (10.34) (10.25)
GDP Growth 0.0031 0.0067 0.0062
(0.64) (1.38) (1.26)
Trade Ratio –0.0047 –0.0569 –0.1133
(–0.05) (–0.57) (–1.16)   
Rule of law –0.0033 –0.0609 –0.0479
(–0.04) (–0.68) (–0.54)   
Political constraint index –0.3986*** –0.3971*** –0.2469** 
(–3.28) (–3.31) (–2.08)   
Log (population) 0.1917 0.2942 0.0173
(0.95) (1.47) (0.16)
Real effective exchange rate –0.0045*** –0.0053*** –0.0047***
(–4.64) (–5.43) (–5.05)   
Human development index 3.0974*** 1.5820***
(5.21) (2.86)
Power distance –0.0050
(–0.50)   
Individualism –0.0261***
(–2.96)   
Masculinity –0.0059
(–0.75)   
Uncertainty Avoidance 0.0014
(0.21)
Intercept –13.7893*** –16.3411*** –12.1970***
(–15.92) (–16.57) (–10.50)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes No 
Obs. 1,208 1,208 1,123 
Adj. R2 45.1% 46.3% 48.7%
Note:  The dependent variable is group-demeaned log (FDI) where FDI is foreign direct
investment for US multinational firms. The group is defined by geographic regions.
Demeaned ShareRights is the group-demeaned Guillen and Capron (2016) cross-national
comparative legal measure of shareholder protection. FDI stock is total FDI. Trade ratio is
defined as (export + import)/GDP. Political constraint index measures political risk. Power
distance, individualism, masculinity and uncertainty avoidance is the Hofstede’s cultural
dimensions. The t-statistics are reported below the estimated coefficients in parentheses. ***,
**, * represents 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.
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systems (COMLAW1) which are based primarily on English common
law, mixed common law systems (COMLAW2) which is a blend of
English common law with elements of customary or religious (usually
Muslim) law, pure civil law (CIVLAW1) systems which are based on
the Roman system and Mixed civil law (CIVLAW2) systems which
combine elements of civil law with customary or religious law. There
are also mixed systems of Muslim law, and customary law as well as
civil and common law (defined as other). Similar to Globerman and
Shapiro (2003), the common law legal system is marginally significant
(10% level) in explaining FDI while civil is insignificant.4 Third, we
include the Political Risk Index (PRS) rating for political and country
risk.5 This measure is highly correlated with the rule of law. Therefore,
we drop the rule of law as a control variable and include PRS rating
instead. The results are similar to those reported in table 3.6 Fourth, we
re-define our dependent variable as US Multinational FDI/Total GDP. 
The results are similar to those presented in table 3.7
V. Discussion and Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature on FDI location attractiveness
(e.g. Dunning, 1998; Buckley et al., 2007; Contractor et al., 2014) and
to the application of agency and bonding theories in explaining the role
of shareholder rights protection when MNE managers decide to expand
via FDI (Lien et al., 2005; Hoskisson et al., 2009; Mason et al., 2017). 
First, we demonstrate that shareholder rights protection has a positive
relationship with FDI flows even though international expansion allows
managers to ‘escape’ more restrictive institutional environments in the
U.S. or elsewhere (e.g. Witt and Lewin, 2007; Barnard and Luiz, 2018).
Second, we contribute to bonding theory, which builds upon the basic
premises of agency theory (Hoskisson et al., 2009), showing support for
the premise that managers exhibit behavior more aligned with
4. Results are not tabulated and available upon request.
5. PRS Group uses a quant-driven approach to measure political risk and provides a
political risk index.
6. Results are not tabulated and available upon request.
7. We would like to thank the referee for this suggestion. Results are not tabulated and
available upon request.
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shareholders’ interests when making international expansion decisions.
The observed impact of shareholder risk on inward FDI provides a
somewhat unique perspective on location attractiveness and
regionalization. First, the logic of a dominant FDI theory in
international business research, internalization theory (Buckley and
Casson, 1998; Buckley et al., 2018), essentially leaves MNEs with a
choice between internalizing transactions (i.e. engage in FDI) or
avoiding countries with weaker institutions altogether (Delios and
Henisz, 2003). However, we have argued that weak shareholder rights
protection is not only unattractive to foreign investment but also that
making capital investments increases, rather than decreases, the
exposure of a firm to the risk of expropriation. In other words, FDI does
not mitigate the risks of expropriation inherent in countries with weak
shareholder rights protection, but rather aggravates the risk. Prior
studies have shown that country risk, operationalized through broad
indices, encourages internalization (Feinberg and Gupta, 2009). Our
finding that MNE investment gravitates towards countries with higher
shareholder rights protection suggests that not all risks are the same
when it comes to entry mode and thus disaggregation of political risk is
warranted in studies of both location choice and entry modes. It would
be useful to re-categorize dimensions of political risk in which capital
investment increases risk exposure and those in which investment
reduces exposure. This would help to reduce the paradoxical
relationship between the location unattractiveness of political risk and
the choice to internalize transaction in response (Giambona et al., 2017).
Institutional similarities within region and differences between
regions are salient predictors of MNEs’ investment and strategizing
patterns leading to regionalization. Our findings suggest that future
research considering the cross-level effects of institutional differences
within regions is warranted. Specifically, ranking a country’s
shareholder rights protection, relative to other members within the
region, may better predict FDI than the absolute stringency of rights
protection alone. Put another way, a country with moderate shareholder
rights protection within a low-rights protection region will attract an
equivalent share of regional FDI as a high shareholder rights country in
a moderate rights protection region. This would have practical
implications for host country governments and is also a worthy
consideration for transnational NGOs using MNE’s as trendsetters for
global institutional standards adoption (Brandl et al., 2019).
Prior research, mainly from the field of economics, has explored the
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phenomenon of countries within regions acting as platforms from which
to serve an integrated region (Azemar and Desbordes, 2010; Cardamone
and Scoppola, 2015; Ghosh et al., 2018; Ghosh and Yamarik, 2019).
Considering how the relative standing of a developing country’s
pro-market institutions impacts foreign direct investment, in comparison
to that of developed countries, it is important to policymakers and
researchers who might otherwise consider institutional quality using a
global lens. That is, while institutional quality may have an overarching
main effect on FDI attractiveness, it likely also has a within-region
effect. Failure to simultaneously consider the within-region and
between-country effects of institutional reform can lead to model
misspecification and also reveals an opportunity for developing
multilevel theory in FDI research (Lien and Filatotchev, 2015). Hence,
we further examine the impact of shareholder rights protection on FDI
attractiveness between developed and developing countries. Hence, the
study of shareholder rights protection and FDI offers a new context in
which to possibly extend the export platform concept, namely, that more
stringent institutional environments act as regional attractors, offering
the potential for spillover effects. Future research could examine the
role of regional institutional hubs in setting regional standards for FDI
regulation and how institutions interact with factor conditions in
attracting FDI within specific sectors. Considering these cross-level
effects between country characteristics and regional development
furthermore offers a novel insight into evolving economic geography.
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